

Certificates for Kubernetes and Container Environments



Kubernetes has become the dominant orchestration platform for containerized applications, and its dynamic, ephemeral nature makes certificate management inside a Kubernetes cluster meaningfully different from managing certificates on traditional, longer-lived servers. This article covers the specific tools and patterns that have emerged for handling certificates well within Kubernetes and broader container environments.

Why Kubernetes Demands a Different Certificate Approach

Pods in a Kubernetes cluster are created and destroyed constantly, often living for minutes or hours rather than the months or years a traditional server might run, and a cluster can scale from a handful of pods to thousands within minutes based on load. Manually managing certificates for individual pods simply does not map onto this model at all; certificate issuance and renewal need to be fully automated and tightly integrated with Kubernetes' own resource lifecycle, treating certificates as just another resource type that gets created, updated, and destroyed alongside the workloads they protect.

cert-manager as the De Facto Standard

cert-manager, an open-source Kubernetes add-on, has become close to the default standard for certificate automation within Kubernetes clusters, extending the Kubernetes API with custom resources representing certificates, issuers, and certificate requests. Once configured, cert-manager automatically requests, renews, and stores certificates as native Kubernetes secrets, integrating tightly with the platform's own declarative, self-healing model rather than requiring a separate, disconnected certificate management process running alongside the cluster.

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Supporting Multiple Issuer Types Simultaneously

cert-manager and similar tools support configuring multiple certificate issuers within the same cluster, commonly combining a public ACME-based issuer, such as Let's Encrypt, for externally facing services with a private internal CA issuer for internal service-to-service certificates, allowing a single cluster to serve both categories of certificate need through a consistent, unified interface rather than managing external and internal certificates through entirely separate tooling.

Service Mesh Integration for Automatic mTLS

Many Kubernetes environments layer a service mesh, such as Istio or Linkerd, on top of the base cluster specifically to automate mutual TLS between every service in the mesh, issuing and rotating short-lived certificates for pod-to-pod communication entirely transparently to the application code running inside those pods. This gives every workload in the mesh strong, certificate-based identity and encrypted communication by default, without requiring individual application developers to implement any certificate handling logic themselves.

Secrets Management for Certificate Material Within the Cluster

Kubernetes' native Secret resources, while convenient, are not inherently encrypted at rest by default in every cluster configuration, and organizations handling genuinely sensitive certificate material should evaluate whether their specific cluster configuration provides adequate protection or whether integrating an external secrets manager, discussed elsewhere in this series, is warranted for the most sensitive keys, particularly anything backing external-facing or high-value internal services.

Handling Certificate Rotation Without Disrupting Running Pods

cert-manager and service mesh implementations generally handle certificate rotation by updating the underlying Kubernetes Secret and triggering a graceful reload within affected pods, but organizations should verify that their specific application configuration actually detects and reloads updated certificate secrets correctly, rather than requiring a full pod restart on every renewal, since the shrinking certificate lifetime schedule discussed throughout this series will make renewal a considerably more frequent event than it has historically been.

Certificate Management for AI Workloads Running in Kubernetes

A substantial and growing share of AI model-serving and agent orchestration infrastructure now runs on Kubernetes, inheriting all of the certificate automation patterns discussed throughout this article directly. Organizations deploying AI workloads to Kubernetes should extend their existing cert-manager and service mesh configuration to cover these new workloads from the start, rather than treating AI-specific pods as a special case requiring separate certificate tooling outside the cluster's already-established automation.



The Countdown Is Already Running: 200 Days, 100 Days, 47 Days

Every certificate conversation in 2026 eventually arrives at the same clock, and it is worth closing on it here. The CA/Browser Forum's Ballot SC-081v3 is not a proposal under discussion; it is an approved, already-in-motion schedule. Maximum public TLS certificate lifetimes fall from 398 days to 200 days on March 15, 2026. They fall again to 100 days on March 15, 2027. By March 15, 2029, they drop to just 47 days, with domain validation itself needing to be re-proven roughly every 10 days.

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Translate that into operational terms and the picture gets stark quickly. An organization currently renewing certificates a few times a year will be handling renewal events on the order of every couple of weeks by the end of this countdown, across every endpoint it operates. Manual tracking, calendar reminders, and a spreadsheet somebody checks once a month will not survive contact with that cadence. What has always been an occasional chore is becoming a continuous, automated operation, whether an organization plans for it or not.

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Kubernetes clusters using cert-manager or a service mesh for automated certificate rotation are already well positioned to absorb the shrinking lifetime schedule below without disruption, since the same automation pattern that handles today's renewal frequency scales naturally to renewals every 47 days without requiring a fundamentally different approach.

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The 200-day, 100-day, and 47-day milestones are not distant hypotheticals; the first has already arrived. Organizations that build the automation loop now, generating keys, vaulting them securely, brokering issuance across Certificate Authorities through APIs, and rebinding certificates to live endpoints without manual intervention, will meet each deadline without disruption. Organizations that wait will be rebuilding their certificate operations under deadline pressure, with far less room for error and far less time to get it right. The countdown is the call to action. The only real decision left is whether to automate on your own schedule, or on the CA/Browser Forum's.

